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A/S/L?1 45/JOHN DOE OFFENDER/FEDERAL PRISON-THE
THIRD CIRCUIT TAKES A HARD LINE AGAINST CHILD
PREDATORS IN UNITED STATES v. TYKARSKY
"[Tihe very nature of the Internet provides an 'ominous method'for anon-
ymous predatory criminal conduct."
2
I. INTRODUCTION
Thanks in part to the popular "Dateline NBC" series, "To Catch a
Predator," Internet sting operations are now familiar to many Americans:
a decoy poses as an underage child 4 and forms an on-line relationship
1. See Nat'l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children, Help Delete Online
Predators: Online Lingo, http://www.missingkids.com/adcouncil/pdf/lingo/on
linelingo.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2007) [hereinafter Online Lingo] (defining "A/
S/L" as online acronym utilized to determine recipient's age, sex, and location);
see also Michael W. Sheetz, Cyberpredators: Police Internet Investigations Under Florida
Statute 847.0135, 54 U. MiAi L. REv. 405, 411 (2000) (noting "A/S/L" is invariably
first question asked by predators to potential victims).
2. United States v. Harrison, 357 F.3d 314, 322 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting
United States v. Dotson, 324 F.3d 256, 260 (4th Cir. 2003)), vacated, 543 U.S. 1102
(2005).
3. See Press Release, MSNBC, "To Catch a Predator" Returns Tuesday, Jan. 30,
2007 (Jan. 26, 2007), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16672318/ [hereinafter
Press Release] (detailing nature and objective of"To Catch a Predator" series). In
the Dateline NBC series "To Catch a Predator," host Chris Hansen travels from
coast-to-coast conducting investigations in which he confronts men who allegedly
use the Internet to solicit sex from minors. See id. (describing concept of show); see
also Alessandra Stanley, The TV Watch; Gotcha! A Walk of Shame for Online Predators,
N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2006, at El (describing nature and objective of "Dateline
NBC" series). Stanley explains that:
"Dateline" works with a civilian watchdog group and local law enforce-
ment to unmask would-be pedophiles using Internet sting operations. An
adult poses as a teenage boy or girl online and invites a predator for a
tryst. The suspect finds himself in a cozy suburban kitchen filled with
snacks, only to discover the "Dateline" correspondent Chris Hansen and
hidden cameras lying in wait.
... The suspects are seemingly ordinary men, many married with chil-
dren, many middle-aged and portly.
Id.
4. See Kimberly Wingteung Seto, Note, How Should Legislation Deal With Chil-
dren as the Victims and Perpetrators of Cyberstalking?, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN's LJ. 67, 75
n.82 (2002) (citing Ashley A. Halfman, Note, Giving Offenders What They Deserve:
Amendments to Federal Sentencing Guidelines Section 2G2.2, Addressing Child Pornography
Distribution, 36 GA. L. REv. 219, 225 (2001) (defining "child")). For the purposes
of this Casebrief, a "child" is "one who '[h]as not reached the age of consent."' See
id. (same); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (Supp. IV 2004) (establishing liability for
offenses against "any individual who has not attained the age of 18 years").
(1071)
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with an adult through Internet chat rooms, 5 Instant Messenger 6 conversa-
tions and emails. 7 If the adult is undeterred after learning of the child's
young age, the relationship continues, with the conversations becoming
increasingly sexually explicit.8 The decoy ultimately consents to meet the
adult, but when the adult arrives at the agreed-upon location, expecting to
5. See Australian Government: NetAlert, Australia's Internet Safety Advisory
Board, http://www.netalert.gov.au/advice/services/chat/what is a chatroom.
html (last visited Sept. 27, 2007) (defining "chat room"). For the purposes of this
Casebrief, an Internet "chat room" is:
[A] place on the Internet where people with similar interests can meet
and communicate together by typing messages on their computer ...
Messages that are typed in by a user appear instantly to everybody who is
in that chat room.... People can enter a chat room without any verifica-
tion of who they are.
Id.
6. See Australian Government: NetAlert, Australia's Internet Safety Advisory
Board, http://www.netalert.gov.au/advice/services/im/What is-instantmessag-
ing.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2007) (defining "Instant Messaging"). For the pur-
poses of this Casebrief, "Instant Messenger" is:
[A program] that can instantly send messages from one computer to an-
other. They are a form of 'instant e-mail' and are very popular with both
children and adults.... Instant messaging programs are usually a one-to-
one communications medium, although some programs allow many peo-
ple to chat to each other at the same time, much like a private chat room.
Id.
7. See Australian Government: NetAlert, Australia's Internet Safety Advisory
Board, http://www.netalert.gov.au/advice/services/email-and-spam/What-is-
email.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2007) (defining "email"). For the purpose of this
Casebrief, "email" is:
[A] shortened version of the two words 'electronic' and 'mail' and can be
considered the electronic version of the letter. . . . Email enables
messages to be transferred from an individual to another individual or
from an individual to a group of people. Documents (audio, video, pic-
tures etc.) can be attached to email messages and sent with the mes-
sage. . . . Email can be sent to anywhere in the world and viewed
whenever the recipient logs onto the Internet and checks their 'mailbox'
where emails are stored.
Id.
8. See Press Release, supra note 3 (describing how sting operations work). In
facilitating these sting operations, members of Perverted Justice, an Internet
watchdog group and paid consultants to Dateline NBC, pretend to be young teens
(ranging in age from eleven- to fifteen-years-old) chatting with adults online; in all
cases, the decoys reveal their assumed ages to the adult. See id. (same). Most of
the men caught in the investigation attempted to solicit the Perverted Justice
decoys for sex. See id. (explaining predators frequently solicit decoys for sex).
Some sent graphic images as well. See id. (mentioning other behavior encountered
by decoys during conversations with predators); see also Young People Subjected to
Sexual Predators-Part I (CNN News broadcast May 3, 2006) (describing how sting
operations are set up). A typical sting operation is conducted as follows:
[T]he first thing that we do is act like a child. We go on to one of the
Internet sites, whether it's MySpace, Yahoo, AOL, and we simply go into a
very generic chat room.
It could be a New Jersey chat room, a New York chat room, and ...
[w]e say, "Hello, I'm a 14-year-old girl," and from there, the fun begins,
and we get hit on by man, after man, after man wanting to send us a
2
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meet the child and engage in previously-discussed sexual acts, the adult is
instead greeted by government agents and arrested. 9
Because the Internet has exponentially increased potential
predators" access to children, government agencies have implemented
sting operations at the local, state and national levels to effectuate the ar-
rests of pedophilesII that use the Internet to find and solicit minors for
sex. 12 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently considered the govern-
picture, wanting us to send them a picture, asking us if we're alone, ask-
ing us if our father is there and what we're doing.
... It can take seconds; it can take minutes. And each and every time, we
are approached by men wanting to meet for sex, wanting to sell us pic-
tures, wanting to engage in cybersex, phone sex.
It's extremely, extremely common and extremely easy to do. And it just
seems that it's at epidemic proportions at this point.
The only limitation to the amount of arrests that we make is our limita-
tion with manpower.
Id.
9. See Press Release, supra note 3 (explaining how alleged predators are
caught). Dateline NBC and Perverted Justice team up with local law enforcement
in each investigation location. See id. (explaining protocol of sting operation).
When the subjects appear at the agreed-upon meeting spot expecting a rendez-
vous with the child, they are arrested and charged. See id. (same).
10. See Posting of Jesamyn Go to Inside Dateline, http://www.msnbc.msn.
com/id/15157004/ (Oct. 6, 2006, 11:55 EST) (defining "predator"). "You're not
a predator if you have occasional fantasies about underage teens and don't take it
further than that. Predators take it to the next step by seeking out images, chats
and eventual meetings with kids. Any attempt to make that kind of fantasy into a
reality is predatory." Id. (quoting Robert Weiss, Executive Director and founder of
the Sexual Recovery Clinic in California) (establishing definition of "predator").
11. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MAN-
UAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 572 (4th ed. 2000) (establishing that criteria for
pedophilia is "[olver a period of at least 6 months, recurrent, intense sexually
arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors involving sexual activity with a
prepubescent child or children (generally age 13 years or younger)"). To be diag-
nosed, the person must be at least sixteen years of age and at least five years older
than the child or children. See id. at 571 (providing further diagnostic criteria).
For the purposes of this Casebrief, the terms "predator" and "pedophile" will be
used interchangeably.
12. See Christa M. Book, Comment, Do You Really Know Who is on the Other Side
of Your Computer Screen? Stopping Internet Crimes Against Children, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 749, 753-54 (2004) (noting children are assisting in catching predators by
teaching FBI agents nationwide how to communicate like teenage girls). Addition-
ally, "[m]any ... local police departments ... now have officers or detectives who
[ ] specialize in Internet sex crimes." Id. at 751 (alteration in original) (quoting
Russell Lissau, Police Hook Pedophile on Web in Five Seconds, CNN, July 24, 2000,
http://www.cnn.com/2000/LOCAL/westcentral/O7/24/ahd.police.web) (estab-
lishing sting operations are happening at local level); see also NAT'L CTR. FOR MISS-
ING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, ONLINE VICTIMIZATION OF YOUTH: FIvE YEARS LATER viii
(2006), http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/pdf/CV138.pdf [hereinafter ONLINE VICTIMIZA-
TION OF YOUTH] (discussing federal law enforcement initiatives directed towards
those who use Internet to harm children and commenting that specialized training
centers have been established to assist law enforcement officers at state and local
level in investigating online crimes against children).
CASEBRIEF 107320071
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ment's role in these sting operations, an issue of first impression within
the circuit. 13 In United States v. Tykarsky, 14 the court determined that law
enforcement officers acted within the statutory limits of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2422(b) 15 and 2423(b)' 6 when they posed as a minor during a sting
operation. 17 Furthermore, the court held that it was unnecessary for the
transaction to involve an actual minor.' 8 In reaching this conclusion, the
Third Circuit appropriately rejected the defense of impossibility in cases
where government decoys have been used to ensnare pedophiles that use
the Internet to find and solicit minors for sex; however, it did not rule on
the viability of other possible defenses.19
This Casebrief examines the Third Circuit's reasoning in Tykarsky and
examines several alternative defenses that future defendants are likely to
raise now that legal impossibility is not a viable option within the circuit.
Part II provides background information on two topics. First, it details the
process that Internet predators use to find their victims and potentially
lure them into a relationship.20 Second, it discusses the history and appli-
cability of the theory of impossibility, as well as the approaches of other
13. See United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 465 (3d Cir. 2006) ("This case
presents the first opportunity for us to address whether the attempt provision of
§ 2422(b) and the travel provision of § 2423(b) require the involvement of an 'ac-
tual minor.'").
14. 446 F.3d 458 (3d Cir. 2006).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (Supp. IV 2004). This section states:
Whoever, using the mail or any facility or means of interstate or foreign
commerce, or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of
the United States knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any
individual who has not attained the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitu-
tion or any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a
criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title and
imprisoned not less than 5 years and not more than 30 years.
Id.
16. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (Supp. IV 2004). This section, entitled "Travel with
intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct," states:
A person who travels in interstate commerce or travels into the United
States, or a United States citizen or an alien admitted for permanent resi-
dence in the United States who travels in foreign commerce, for the pur-
pose of engaging in any illicit sexual conduct with another person shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.
Id.
17. See Tykarsky, 446 F.3d at 468 (noting government's dependence on sting
operations in enforcing child predation crimes and concluding Congress did not
intend to prohibit this method of enforcement); see also H.R. REP. No. 105-557, at
19 (1998) (asserting Committee's position that "law enforcement plays an impor-
tant role in discovering child sex offenders on the Internet before they are able to
victimize an actual child").
18. See Tykarsky, 446 F.3d at 468-69 ("[W]e hold that the lack of an actual
minor is not a defense to a charge of attempted persuasion, inducement, entice-
ment or coercion of a minor in violation of § 2422(b).").
19. See id. at 464, 476 n.13 (noting denial of Tykarsky's sentencing entrap-
ment defense by district court due to lack of support for this defense in record).
20. For a discussion of the luring process used by Internet predators, see infra
notes 30-39 and accompanying text.
1074
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circuit courts in handling cases involving online sting operations. 2 1 Part
III establishes the facts and procedural posture of Tykarsky and analyzes
the reasoning employed by the Third Circuit in reaching its conclusion in
Tykarsky. 22 Part IV outlines the alternative defenses available to defend-
ants in lieu of legal impossibility, specifically entrapment, sentencing en-
trapment and the fantasy/role playing defense. 2 3 Finally, Part V
concludes with recommendations for practitioners, including how to suc-
cessfully anticipate, prepare for, and litigate alternative defense claims.
24
II. BACKGROUND
A. Pedophiles' Playground: The Internet2 5
The Internet is an invaluable tool for pedophiles, providing easy, in-
stantaneous access to millions of children at any given time. 26 The anony-
21. For a discussion of the history and applicability of the doctrine of impossi-
bility, see infra notes 40-61 and accompanying text. For a discussion of how other
circuit courts have handled similar cases, see infra notes 62-66 and accompanying
text.
22. For a discussion of the facts and procedural posture of United States v.
Tykarsky, see infra notes 67-81 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
Third Circuit's reasoning in Tykarsky, see infra notes 82-94 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of the potential alternative defenses that defendants are
likely to raise, see infra notes 95-121 and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of recommendations to practitioners for ways in which to
effectively prepare for and litigate such cases, see infra notes 122-129 and accompa-
nying text.
25. See ProtectKids.com, Protecting Children in Cyberspace, http://www.
protectkids. com/dangers/onlinepred.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2007) ("Often we
think of pedophiles as having access to children out on the playground and other
places, but because of the way the Internet works, children can actually be
interacting on their home computers with adults who pretend to be children.").
26. See AMANDA LENHART ET AL., PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT,
TEENS AND TECHNOLOGY. YOUTH ARE LEADING THE TRANSITION TO A FULLY WIRED
AND MOBILE NATION (2005), http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIPTeens_Tech_
July2005web.pdf (finding eighty-seven percent of teens aged twelve through seven-
teen use Internet, and approximately eleven million teens go online daily); see also
ONLINE VICTIMIZATION OF YOUTH, supra note 12, at 71 (estimating that there are
24,780,000 Internet users ranging in age from ten to seventeen-years-old); DONALD
F. ROBERTS ET AL., THE HENRYJ. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, GENERATION M: MEDIA
IN THE LIvEs OF 8-18 YEAR-OLDS 30 (2005), http://www.kff.org/entmedia/upload/
Generation-M-Media-in-the-Lives-of-8-18-Year-olds-Report.pdf (finding fifty-four
percent of United States eight- to eighteen-year-olds use computers daily for recre-
ational purposes and that average time devoted on daily basis to recreational com-
puter use is over one hour). The study also found that more than half of the time
eight- to eighteen-year-olds spend on the computer daily is devoted to online activi-
ties. See id. (reporting that Instant Messaging, visiting websites, visiting chat rooms,
and sending emails accounts for more than half of time spent by eight- to eigh-
teen-year-olds on computer). The study further discovered that as children get
older, the amount of time spent each day on the computer increases, and this
increased usage is accompanied by a corresponding increase in the amount of
time spent Instant Messaging and visiting websites. See id. (noting relationship be-
tween age and computer usage and commenting that increase in overall computer
time "is mirrored in the averages for [w]eb sites and [I]nstant [M]essaging").
2007] CASEBRIEF 1075
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mous nature of the Internet serves as a protective shield for predators,
allowing them to create identities that fail to raise children's suspicions,
while simultaneously minimizing their chances of identification and cap-
ture. 27 Furthermore, Congress has yet to draft a statute that successfully
regulates inappropriate materials on the Internet and can withstand First
Amendment scrutiny by the courts. 28 The consequence of this failure by
the federal government is that there is virtually no regulation on the infor-
mation that minors can access on the Internet, while predators are simul-
taneously left with an ideal setting in which to execute their deviant
fantasies. 29
B. Pedophiles' Bag of Tricks: The Luring Process
The "getting-to-know-you" questions that are the hallmark of a new
friendship are ostensibly harmless; they take on a sinister cast, however,
when an Internet predator is the one doing the asking.30 Predators will
initially contact many children in an attempt to find one that matches
their preferences, is responsive to the predators' conversation and ques-
tions and is not subject to strict parental supervision.3 1 Once predators
have a willing victim, they will use the "befriending" process to create a
27. See M. Megan McCune, Comment, Virtual Lollipops and Lost Puppies: How
Far Can States Go to Protect Minors Through the Use of Internet Luring Laws, 14 COM-
MLAw CONSPECrUs 503, 506 (2006) (noting that sexual predators use anonymous
nature of Internet to "creat[e] an identity that may not cause youth to be
alarmed"); see also Book, supra note 12, at 750 (stating that pedophiles' odds of
being caught are very low because they do not have to reveal true identity); Sandra
M. Klepach, Officers Troll Internet To Reel In Sex Predators: Undercover Detectives Protect
Local Children From Online Strangers who Travel for Trysts, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL,
July 10, 2006, at Al (explaining why predators are attracted to Internet for pur-
poses of soliciting children).
Anonymity, opportunity and the instant gratification of online chats at-
tract criminals who may not otherwise act on their compulsions, said Gail
Carmon, supervisor of mental health and substance abuse services at the
Medina [Ohio] County Jail. "But I also think the longer they engage in
these behaviors, the sort of bolder they become," she said. "The Internet
. . . gives them this sense that they can be behind the scenes, can be
testing the waters in their own living room."
Id.
28. See McCune, supra note 27, at 507 (commenting that although federal
government recognizes danger posed to children by Internet, it has failed to create
statutory regulations able to withstand First Amendment scrutiny).
29. See id. (noting that consequences of government's failure to create statu-
tory regulations on Internet content is that youth have no limitations on materials
they can access); see also Sheetz, supra note 1, at 419-20 (observing that Internet is
ideal setting for fulfillment of predators' deviant behavior due to its fantasy-like
qualities).
30. See generally McCune, supra note 27, at 512-13 (describing luring process).
31. See Book, supra note 12, at 756 (explaining how online predators select
victims); see alsoJennifer Gregg, Note, Caught in the Web: Entrapment in Cyberspace, 19
HASTINGS COMM. & Er. L.J. 157, 162 (1996) (describing how predators "stake out"
chat rooms frequented by teenagers until they find one suited to their preferences,
at which point predator will invite teen to talk privately).
1076 [Vol. 52: p. 1071
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relationship with the child, to tap into the child's vulnerabilities and to
learn about and test the child's limits. 32 As it is important during this
phase that the child perceives the predator as understanding and affec-
tionate, predators will often give the child gifts to facilitate the formation
of this perception. 3 To safeguard the relationship from parental interfer-
ence, predators will typically go to great lengths to ensure that the child
keeps the communication a secret.
34
Once predators have established a solid relationship with the child,
they will reveal their sexual motives and desires to the child.3 5 For exam-
ple, predators will often send links to pornographic websites in an effort to
counter possible resistance and lower the child's inhibitions.3 6 Predators
may also offer to provide the child drugs or alcohol to calm the child's
nerves about engaging in the sexual activity. 37 The luring process will
often culminate in a face-to-face meeting between the predator and the
child; alarmingly, a majority of children who meet an online predator
32. See McCune, supra note 27, at 513 (describing how predators use child's
online profile to learn about child's likes and dislikes and then assert same likes
and dislikes to create rapport with child). During the befriending process, which
typically lasts at least one month, predators will take advantage of the trust they
have gained from the child by asking the child personal questions to learn about
the child's insecurities. See id. (describing techniques used by predators to gain
information about child). Predators rarely resort to deception or violence, choos-
ing instead to cater to the victim's interest and curiosity in sex and romance. See
ONLINE VICTIMIZATION OF YOUTH, supra note 12, at 24 (describing solicitation tac-
tics of predators).
33. See Book, supra note 12, at 757 (acknowledging that children who are ne-
glected or feel neglected are often most susceptible to online predators, which is
why predators try to portray themselves as affectionate and understanding); see also
Janis Wolak et al., Escaping or Connecting? Characteristics of Youth Who Form Close On-
line Relationships, 26J. ADOLESCENCE 105, 110 (2003) (reporting risk factors associ-
ated with forming close online relationships). Girls who reported high levels of
parent-child conflict and being highly troubled were more likely than other girls to
form close online relationships. See id. at 110 (establishing problem characteristics
that are associated with close online relationships among girls). For boys, five fac-
tors were significantly associated with the formation of close online relationships:
being non-Hispanic white, having low communication with their parents, being
highly troubled, having high amounts of Internet use, and having home Internet
access. See id. at 113-15 (providing problem characteristics that are associated with
close online relationships among boys).
34. See Book, supra note 12, at 757 (listing potential tactics employed by
predators to ensure child keeps relationship secret). These techniques include,
inter alia, teaching the child to permanently delete emails, urging the child to set
up a separate email account, or providing the child with prepaid calling cards in
order to have covert phone conversations. See id. (same).
35. See McCune, supra note 27, at 513 (explaining that majority of predators
introduce sexual topics to child once befriending process has concluded).
36. See Book, supra note 12, at 757 (detailing techniques employed by
predators to lower child's inhibitions about engaging in sexual activity with
predators); see also Gregg, supra note 31, at 163 (noting predators' luring tech-
niques include "sending pictures of himself or herself, pictures of nude children,
or requesting pictures from the underage victims").
37. See Book, supra note 12, at 757 (providing additional techniques).
10772007] CASEBRIEF
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face-to-face will also willingly accompany the predator to another location,
substantially increasing the dangerousness of the situation.3 8 The conse-
quences of these meetings can be devastating to the child-a victim of
sexual abuse often suffers from severe psychological damage, likely to have
a permanent impact on the victim's life.
39
C. Pedaphiles' Go-To Defense: The "Murky" Doctrine of Impossibility4 °
Defendants ensnared in Internet sting operations have consistently
relied on impossibility, a defense with deep historical underpinnings trace-
able to the English common law system. 4 1 When the theory was initially
introduced in the English courts, defendants' culpability was measured "by
looking at the completed crime and whether completion was factually pos-
sible."42 Various judicial systems ultimately established distinctions within
the doctrine, leading to the creation of two separate prongs: factual impos-
sibility and legal impossibility.43 As applied to attempt crimes, defendants
raise this defense to argue that the defendants' action could not result in
the commission of the underlying offense because the context of the situa-
tion made completion of the offense impossible.
44
38. See McCune, supra note 27, at 513-14 (outlining face-to-face portion of
luring process and dangers it poses to children). Additionally, just under half of
children who meet sexual predators face-to-face will spend the night with them.
See id. at 514 (describing potential outcome of face-to-face encounters between
children and predators).
39. See Seto, supra note 4, at 76 (recognizing face-to-face meetings can cause
child to experience feelings of "guilt, betrayal, rage, and worthlessness"); see also
Book, supra note 12, at 757-58 (noting abuse can have "life-altering" effects on
victims, including but not limited to "depression, eating disorders, distrust, [and]
sexual dysfunction"). Additionally, victims may develop self-destructive behaviors
such as "cutting or burning [themselves] ... alcohol or drug abuse, excessive risk
taking, withholding food or overeating, poor hygiene, excessive bathing, or suicide
attempts." See Book, supra note 12, at 758 (listing potential negative side effects of
sexual abuse on children).
40. See United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 465 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting
United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 199 (3d Cir. 1998)) (observing that "[t]he law
of impossible attempts has received much scholarly attention, but remains a murky
area of the law").
41. See Audrey Rogers, New Technology, Old Defenses: Internet Sting Operations and
Attempt Liability, 38 U. RICH. L. REv. 477, 493 (2004) (noting doctrine of impossibil-
ity developed out of "historical reluctance to punish defendants for unconsum-
mated crimes"). The theory emerged in Regina v. Collins, (1864) 169 Eng. Rep.
1477 (A.C.), in which the court held that a defendant who picked an empty pocket
was not guilty of attempted larceny. See id. (establishing historical underpinnings
of impossibility); see also Kyle S. Brodie, The Obviously Impossible Attempt: A Proposed
Revision to the Model Penal Code, 15 N. ILL. U. L. Rv. 237, 238 (1995) (same).
42. See Rogers, supra note 41, at 494 (detailing how culpability was measured
in original impossibility defense).
43. See id. (suggesting that distinction between factual and legal impossibility
is further evidence ofjudicial discomfort with punishing unconsummated crimes).
44. See Brodie, supra note 41, at 237 (explaining impossibility defense).
1078 [Vol. 52: p. 1071
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1. Factual Impossibility
Factual impossibility exists in situations where the defendant's in-
tended criminal conduct was thwarted by unforeseen circumstances that
prevented the successful consummation of the crime. 45 The Third Circuit
further clarifies that factual impossibility occurs when "extraneous circum-
stances unknown to the actor or beyond his control" act as an obstacle to
the defendant's completion of the intended crime. 46 An illustration of
factual impossibility is when someone fires a shotgun at a bed with the
intent of killing the person in the bed, but does not realize that the in-
tended victim is not in the bed at the time the shot is fired. 47 Common
law provides that the doctrine of factual impossibility is not a viable de-
fense. 48 The imposition of criminal liability for attempt in situations in-
volving factual impossibility is generally a result of courts' emphasis on
"proof of [the defendant's] intent to commit a specific crime," rather than
the actual results of the defendant's efforts.
49
2. Legal Impossibility
Legal impossibility exists when the act committed was not in fact ille-
gal. 50 Legal commentators, however, have further nuanced the concept of
impossibility by subdividing legal impossibility into two different catego-
ries: "hybrid" legal impossibility and "pure" legal impossibility. 5 1 Hybrid
legal impossibility exists when "the actor's goal is illegal, but commission
45. See United States v. Frazier, 560 F.2d 884, 888 (8th Cir. 1977) (defining
factual impossibility).
46. See United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 465 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting
United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 188 (3d Cir. 1973)) (defining factual
impossibility).
47. See id. (quoting United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 199 (3d Cir. 1998))
(providing example of factual impossibility); see also Berrigan, 482 F.2d at 188
(same). As explained by the Berrigan court, "[t] he classic example [of factual im-
possibility] is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the
intent to steal his wallet and finds the pocket empty." Berrigan, 482 F.2d at 188
(same).
48. See Tykarsky, 446 F.3d at 465 (recognizing that common law provides that
factual impossibility is not permissible defense); see also Frazier, 560 F.2d at 888
(noting that distinction exists between factual and legal impossibility and stating
that only legal impossibility is permissible defense); WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AuSTiN W.
SCorr, JR., CRIMINAL LAw § 6.3(A)(2) (2d ed. 1986) ("All courts are in agreement
that what is usually referred to as 'factual impossibility' is no defense to a charge of
attempt.").
49. See Berrigan, 482 F.2d at 188 (noting that factual impossibility cases result-
ing in criminal liability typically turn on proof of intent).
50. See Tykarsky, 446 F.3d at 465 (stating that "[l]egal impossibility is said to
occur where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime"
(quoting Hsu, 155 F.3d at 199)).
51. See Rogers, supra note 41, at 494-95 (noting that legal scholars such as
Professor Joshua Dressier have identified two types of legal impossibility); see also
Tykarsky, 446 F.3d at 465 n.3 (setting forth difference between "pure" legal impossi-
bility and "hybrid" legal impossibility).
2007] CASEBRIEF 1079
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of the offense is impossible due to a factual mistake.., regarding the legal
status of some attendant circumstance that constitutes an element of the
charged offense."5 2 Some examples of hybrid legal impossibility include a
hunter shooting a stuffed deer having mistakenly believed it to be alive, or
a prisoner attempting to smuggle letters past the prison warden under the
mistaken belief that the warden has prohibited this conduct. 53 This doc-
trine has received criticism due to the barely distinguishable semantic dif-
ference between hybrid legal impossibility and factual impossibility. 54
In the alternative, pure legal impossibility exists when "the intended
acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime."55 Under pure le-
gal impossibility, the defendant's impure intentions are not relevant be-
cause there is no law criminalizing the defendant's conduct. 56 For
instance, if a person held a poker game in a Las Vegas hotel room, with
the intent to break a gambling law, no attempt would exist due to the fact
that it is impossible to gamble illegally in Las Vegas.57 Despite courts' dif-
ficulty in differentiating between the various forms of impossibility, pure
legal impossibility remains a viable defense and, if legal impossibility ex-
52. See Rogers, supra note 41, at 495 (quotingJosHuA DRESSLER, UNDERSTAND-
ING CRIMINAL LAW § 9.01 [B] (3d ed. 2001)) (defining hybrid legal impossibility); see
alsoJeffrey T. Goudie, Case Digest, Criminal Law-Doctrine of Impossibility-The Doc-
trine of Impossibility Does Not Provide a Defense to Attempted Distribution of Obscene Mate-
rial to a Minor or to Solicitation of Third-Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct. People v.
Thousand, 631 N.W.2d 694 (Mich. 2001), 80 U. DET. L. REv. 175, 176 (2002)
("[H]ybrid legal impossibility exists if the defendant's intended act constitutes a
crime but consummation of the crime is impossible because of a factual mistake
regarding the legal status of his behavior.").
53. See Tykarsky, 446 F.3d at 465 (providing examples of hybrid legal
impossibility).
54. See Rogers, supra note 41, at 498 (quoting DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING
CRIMINAL LAW § 9.01 [B] (3d ed. 2001)) (noting that "by skillful characterization,
one can describe virtually any case of hybrid legal impossibility ... as an example
of factual impossibility"). Accordingly, the drafters of the Model Penal Code as-
serted that the distinction between factual and legal impossibility should be abol-
ished for several reasons. See id. at 499 (stating reasoning of drafters). These
reasons included:
[L]egal impossibility doctrine focuses unnaturally on what actually tran-
spired rather than what defendant believed, leading to strained reasoning
at odds with conventional understanding of terms such as intent and pur-
pose. Second, the Model Penal Code drafters opined that the proper
approach to criminality should focus on the dangerousness of the actor
as manifested by his intent, rather than his actions.
Id.; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt. 3(a)-(c) (describing reasons for re-
jecting impossibility defense).
55. See Tykarsky, 446 F.3d at 465 (quoting Berrigan, 482 F.2d at 188) (defining
pure legal impossibility).
56. See Rogers, supra note 41, at 495 (explaining that "ignorance of the lack of
a law criminalizing a defendant's conduct cannot inculpate him").
57. See Brodie, supra note 41, at 238 (providing example of legal impossi-
bility).
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ists, the presence of factual impossibility is thereafter irrelevant to the
inquiry.
58
3. Impossibility and Internet Sting Operations
As applied to Internet sting operation cases, defendants use impossi-
bility to assert that it was legally impossible for them to persuade a minor
to engage in sexual activity because the "minor" was actually an adult gov-
ernment decoy, and therefore any sexual activity that occurred between
the defendant and the decoy would not have constituted a criminal ac-
tion. 59 The government's counterargument to this assertion is that the
defendant's conduct was actually factually impossible, because the defen-
dant fully intended to engage in the conduct proscribed by the law and
failed only because of circumstances unknown to and beyond the control
of the defendant (namely, that the defendant was communicating with a
non-minor). 60 This distinction is dispositive to the court's ruling on the
matter; however, defendants have generally been unsuccessful in prevail-
ing on this distinction.
6 1
D. Pedophiles Test Their Luck in the Circuit Courts
A direct correlation exists between the Internet's saturation of Ameri-
can culture and the number of sexual offenses committed against chil-
dren. 62 This increase in online sexual offenses has been accompanied by
58. See Rogers, supra note 41, at 500 (stating that legal impossibility remains
valid defense despite its controversial nature). Professor Rogers asserts that the
defense of legal impossibility has retained its viability for a variety of reasons: first,
some courts specifically permit it; second, other courts decline to address it and
base rulings on factual impossibility instead, leaving legal impossibility as a poten-
tial option; and third, based on courts' imprecise use of the term. See id. (listing
reasons why legal impossibility remains valid defense); see also Brodie, supra note
41, at 240 (stating that court's finding of legal impossibility renders presence of
factual impossibility irrelevant).
59. See, e.g., Tykarsky, 446 F.3d at 465 (establishing defendants' theory of im-
possibility in Internet sting operation cases and explaining grounds for defend-
ants' belief that their conduct should qualify as legally impossible rather than
factually impossible).
60. See id. (explaining government's position on why defendant's conduct
should be categorized as factually impossible rather than legally impossible).
61. See Brodie, supra note 41, at 238 (emphasizing that courts' determination
of whether case involves legal or factual impossibility is dispositive); see also Book,
supra note 12, at 772 (commenting that "impossibility defense does not seem to be
working for defendants"). For further discussion of how courts have handled the
impossibility defense in Internet sting operation cases, see infra notes 66 and 79
and accompanying text.
62. See Seto, supra note 4, at 75 (observing that research has confirmed that as
volume of people with Internet access increases, so has "the number of incidents
of child pornography and other kinds of sexual crimes against children" (quoting
Ashley A. Halfman, Giving Offenders What They Deserve: Amendments to Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines Section 2G2.2, Addressing Child Pornography Distribution, 36 GA. L. REv.
219, 225 (2001))); see also ONLINE VICTIMIZATION OF YOUTH, supra note 12, at 1
(providing results of recent report tracking online activities of youth). This recent
2007] 1081
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an increase in the number of suits against online predators. 63 While this is
an issue of first impression in the Third Circuit, other circuit courts have
already had an opportunity to evaluate cases involving Internet predators
snared in sting operations. 64 Specifically, the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth
and Eleventh Circuits have all addressed the viability of the impossibility
defense in Internet predator cases.6 5 Each of these courts has concluded
that a defendant's mistaken belief as to the age of the intended victim is
insufficient to relieve the defendant of criminal liability, and that an actual
minor's involvement is unnecessary for conviction.
66
III. ANALYSiS
A. A Local Pedophile in Action: United States v. Tykarsky
1. Facts
After entering an America Online ("AOL") chat room entitled "Ilove-
oldermen2," Todd Tykarsky, a forty-year-old man 6 7 using the screen name
"toddyty63," initiated a conversation with "HeatherJetl4," a government
report found that between February 2000 and March 2005, the number of youth
Internet users who encountered unwanted exposure to sexual materials and on-
line harassment increased, despite the fact that during this same time period,
there was an increase in the use of filtering, blocking and monitoring software in
the homes of youth Internet users. See ONLINE VICTIMIZATION OF YOUTH, supra
note 12, at 1 (same).
63. See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Innocent Images National Initiative,
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/innocent.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2007) (noting
1789% increase in number of child pornography and child sexual exploitation
cases opened by FBI (from 113 cases to 2135 cases) between fiscal years 1996 and
2006).
64. See Tykarsky, 446 F.3d at 465 (noting this issue had not previously arisen
within Third Circuit). For a discussion of the cases adjudicated by other circuit
courts, see infra notes 66, 79 and 84 and accompanying text.
65. For a discussion of the cases adjudicated by other circuit courts, see infra
notes 66, 79 and 84 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., United States v. Sims, 428 F.3d 945, 959-60 (10th Cir. 2005) (de-
termining that defendant cannot assert his false belief that minor was involved as
defense to charge involving enticement and exploitation of minors); United States
v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705, 720 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that "[t]he fact that [defen-
dant] was mistaken in his belief that he was corresponding with a minor does not
mitigate or absolve his criminal culpability"); United States v. Root, 296 F.3d 1222,
1227 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that "belief that a minor was involved is sufficient
to sustain an attempt conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)"); United States v.
Farner, 251 F.3d 510, 513 (5th Cir. 2001) (concluding that legal impossibility is
normally not defense to attempt to violate § 2422(b)); United States v. Bailey, 228
F.3d 637, 639 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that attempt provision of § 2422(b) is con-
stitutional and that restriction "does not infringe on any constitutionally protected
rights of adults").
67. See United States Attorney's Office, Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
News Release: June 23, 2003, http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/pae/News/Pr/2003/
jun/tykarsky.htmi (last visited Feb. 22, 2007) (providing age of defendant).
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agent posing as a fourteen-year-old girl.68 Over the course of the next
month, Tykarsky and "HeatherJetl4" engaged in multiple conversations
via both Instant Messenger and email, during which Tykarsky expressed
his strong desire to engage in sexual activity with "HeatherJetl4."69 Ap-
proximately two weeks into the online relationship, upon Tykarsky's re-
quest for pictures of "HeatherJetl4," the government decoy provided a
photograph of herself at age fourteen or fifteen. 70 Shortly thereafter, in
spite of admitting that he was "a little scared" because of her young age,
Tykarsky and the decoy discussed the possibility of a face-to-face meet-
ing.7 1 Roughly one week later, after Tykarsky and the decoy agreed upon
a meeting location, Tykarsky described in explicit detail the sexual activi-
ties he planned to engage in with the minor upon their meeting.
72
On the day of the planned rendezvous, Tykarsky arrived at the
agreed-upon location and entered the hotel, where he was arrested and
searched by Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") agents. 73 During the
course of a subsequent interrogation, to which Tykarsky consented, the
FBI elicited incriminating statements from Tykarsky regarding his inten-
tion to have sex with "HeatherJetl4," despite his belief that she was only
fourteen years old.7 4 In addition, after his arrest, Tykarsky consented to a
search of his home, which by extension included his computer. 75 Based
on his confession, as well as articles seized from his home, Tykarsky was
charged with interstate travel to engage in illicit sexual conduct with a
68. See Tykarsky, 446 F.3d at 461 (setting forth relevant facts of case). In addi-
tion to the screen name "toddyty63," Tykarsky also communicated with
"HeatherJetl4" using the screen name "golpherl2345." See id. (same).
69. See id. (noting that conversations occurred between Tykarsky and govern-
ment decoy on at least eight different occasions, and commenting on explicit sex-
ual nature of those conversations).
70. See id. at 462 (recounting that, upon Tykarsky's request, government de-
coy supplied photographs of herself).
71. See id. (observing that Tykarsky commented he could get into trouble and
go to jail if his relationship with "HeatherJetl4" was discovered).
72. See id. (describing meeting arrangements between Tykarsky and govern-
ment decoy and noting Tykarsky's continued excitement to meet "HeatherJetl4").
73. See id. (detailing facts of Tykarsky's arrest).
74. See id. (establishing that Tykarsky admitted to knowing "HeatherJetl4" was
only fourteen years old, that he thought about having sex with her and that al-
though he thought he should not follow through with it, he ultimately proceeded
with plans to meet her).
75. See id. (describing search of Tykarsky's home). The search was conducted
pursuant to Tykarsky's consent and to a search warrant. See id. (detailing relevant
facts). Upon searching Tykarsky's residence, FBI agents seized his computer,
which was subsequently analyzed by the Computer Analysis Response Team
("CART"), a subdivision of the FBI. See id. (same). CART's analysis confirmed that
Tykarsky's computer had software and "buddy lists" affiliated with both screen
names used by Tykarsky in his conversations with the government decoy. See id.
(same). Both buddy lists included the screen name "HeatherJetl4." See id.
(same). Additionally, a copy of the photograph that the decoy had sent to Tykar-
sky was recovered from his computer's hard drive. See id. (same).
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minor (count one) 76 and using an interstate facility to attempt to per-
suade a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity (count tWo). 7 7
2. Procedural Posture
Prior to his trial, Tykarsky filed a motion asserting a legal impossibility
defense based on the fact that an actual minor had not been involved in
the transaction. 78 Relying on appellate court decisions, the district court
denied Tykarsky's motion, rejecting his impossibility defense and holding
that "[a] n actual victim is not required for a prosecution of attempt under
§ 2422 or for travel with the requisite intent under § 2423." 79 At trial,
76. See id. at 462 n.1 (detailing charge against Tykarsky). Count one of the
indictment charged as follows:
On or about May 21, 2003, at Philadelphia, in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, and elsewhere, defendant TODD TYKARSKY a/k/a "tod-
dyty63," a/k/a "golpherl2345," traveled from NewJersey to Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania for the purpose of engaging in, and attempting to engage
in, illicit sexual conduct, as defined in Title 18, United States Code, Sec-
tion 2243(f), that is, a sexual act as defined in Title 18, United States
Code, Section 2246(2), with a person under eighteen years of age. In
violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2423(b) and (e).
Id. (providing text of count one of indictment).
77. See id. at 463 n.2 (detailing charges against Tykarsky). Count two of the
indictment charged as follows:
Between on or about April 22, 2003 and on or about May 20, 2003, at
Philadelphia, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and elsewhere, de-
fendant TODD TYKARSKY a/k/a "toddtty63," a/k/a "golpherl2345,"
used a facility in interstate commerce, that is, a computer modem con-
nected to the Internet to attempt to knowingly persuade, induce, entice
and coerce a person under eighteen years of age to engage in sexual
activity for which the defendant could be charged with a criminal offense,
that is, statutory rape, in violation of NewJersey Statutes 2C:14-2 and Title
18, Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes Annotated, Section 3122.1. In vi-
olation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2422(b).
Id. (providing text of count two of indictment).
78. See id. at 463 (explaining grounds for impossibility defense). Apart from
the motion to dismiss the indictment based on the impossibility defense, Tykarsky
filed three other motions: first, prior to his trial, he filed a motion to suppress the
statements he made to FBI officers immediately after his arrest; second, after the
verdict, he filed a motion for judgment of acquittal and a new trial pursuant to
Rules 29, 33 and 34 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; and third, after
the denial of his post-trial motions but before sentencing, he filed a motion for
discovery of additional exculpatory evidence. See id. at 463-64 (setting forth Tykar-
sky's additional motions).
79. See id. at 463 (establishing that district court rejected impossibility defense
and holding, based on statutory text, that actual minor is not necessary); see also
United States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705, 718 (9th Cir. 2004) (observing that inclusion
of attempt provision in 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) "underscores Congress's effort to im-
pose liability regardless of whether the defendant succeeded in the commission of
his intended crime"); United States v. Root, 296 F.3d 1222, 1227 (11th Cir. 2002)
(noting that attempt provision indicates that "[t]he fact that [the defendant's]
crime had not ripened into a completed offense is no obstacle to an attempt con-
viction"); United States v. Farner, 251 F.3d 510, 512 (5th Cir. 2001) ("The distinc-
tion between factual and legal impossibility is elusive at best. Most federal courts
[Vol. 52: p. 10711084
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 5 [2007], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol52/iss5/5
2007] CASEBRIEF 1085
Tykarsky was convicted on both counts and sentenced to five years in
prison. 80 Shortly thereafter, Tykarsky appealed to the Third Circuit.8 1
B. The Third Circuit's Reasoning
In analyzing Tykarsky's legal impossibility challenge, the Third Circuit
first acknowledged the problematic nature of this defense due to the elu-
sive distinction between legal and factual impossibility. 8 2 According to the
court, however, the issue of whether impossibility applies is not a matter of
semantically differentiating between factual and legal impossibility, but
rather a matter of legislative intent. 83 To ascertain Congress's intent re-
garding the attempt provision of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), the court initially
looked to the language of the statute, and concluded that Congress did
not intend for the actual persuasion of a minor to be necessary for a con-
viction.84 Expanding upon the presumed purpose of the intent provision,
have repudiated the distinction or have at least openly questioned its usefulness."
(internal citations omitted)).
Regarding Tykarsky's other motions, the district court denied his motion to
suppress statements he made to the FBI officers after his arrest because the court
determined that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights prior to
speaking with the officers. See Tykarsky, 446 F.3d at 463 (describing reasoning of
lower court). The district court also denied Tykarsky's motion for a judgment of
acquittal and a new trial because the court determined that the Government had
provided sufficient evidence to support an inference by the jury that Tykarsky trav-
eled across state lines for the purpose of engaging in criminal sexual activity. See
id. at 463-64 (same). His pre-sentencing motion for discovery of additional excul-
patory evidence was denied after the district court deemed it a "fishing expedi-
tion." See id. at 464 (same).
80. See Tykarsky, 446 F.3d at 463 (describing outcome of Tykarsky's trial). At
trial, the Government admitted into evidence the nine Instant Messenger and
email conversations that occurred between Tykarsky and the government decoy,
Tykarsky's statements during his post-arrest interrogation, evidence seized from his
computer during the lawful search of his home and testimony from the FBI case
agent who documented the interrogation that occurred at the arrest scene. See id.
(detailing evidence presented at trial). Tykarsky did not testify in his own defense.
See id. (describing trial).
81. See id. at 464 (noting that appeal to Third Circuit followed district court's
denial of Tykarsky's impossibility motion and asserting that Third Circuit has juris-
diction to review Tykarsky's conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982) and his sen-
tence under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2003)).
82. See id. at 466 (commenting on "elusiveness" of distinction between legal
and factual impossibility and noting that many jurisdictions have eschewed distinc-
tion and abolished impossibility defense entirely). The court further noted that
the American Law Institute's position, as set forth in the Model Penal Code
("MPC") Commentaries, supports the abolition of the legal impossibility defense.
See id. ("The purpose of [the MPC's definition of attempt] is to eliminate legal
impossibility as a defense to an attempt charge." (alteration in original)),
83. See id. (describing appropriate application of legal impossibility as defense
within Third Circuit). "Even assuming that this is a case of legal impossibility, it is
well established in this Court that the availability of legal impossibility as a defense
to a crime is a matter of legislative intent." Id. (same).
84. See id. (noting that plain language of statute, including "attempt" provi-
sion, suggests that actual persuasion of minor is not necessary for conviction); see
15
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the court explained that Congress designed the provision such that liabil-
ity turns on the defendant's subjective intent, rather than the actual age of
the alleged victim.
8 5
Noting that the purpose of the statute was to provide a comprehen-
sive solution to prevent crimes against children, the court further con-
cluded that Congress did not intend for legal impossibility to be a
permissible defense.8 6 The court deemed it significant that Congress
drafted and enacted § 2422 (b) "at a time when 'the doctrine of impossibil-
ity had become mired in fine distinctions and had lost whatever accept-
ance at common law it may have possessed .... ,,87 This observation
provided the court with affirmation that legal impossibility was not aligned
with congressional intent.88 Finally, the court noted that if it were to
also United States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705, 718 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that inclusion
of attempt provision "underscores Congress's effort to impose liability regardless
of whether the defendant succeeded in the commission of his intended crime");
United States v. Root, 296 F.3d 1222, 1227 (11th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that at-
tempt provision suggests that "[t] he fact that [the defendant's] crime had not rip-
ened into a completed offense is no obstacle to an attempt conviction").
85. See Tykarsky, 446 F.3d at 466-67 (explaining that interpreting language of
statute to require involvement of actual minor would "render the attempt provi-
sion largely meaningless").
86. See id. at 467 (noting that, as in two other Third Circuit cases, evidence in
present case regarding underlying purpose of statute suggests Congress did not
intend for legal impossibility to be permissible defense); see generally United States
v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 201 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding statute at issue was designed to
be comprehensive solution for corporate espionage and that Congress could not
have intended legal impossibility to apply because it would frustrate federal efforts
to enforce statute); United States v. Everett, 700 F.2d 900, 904 (3d Cir. 1983) (re-
viewing legislative history of Drug Control Act, noting that it was designed to be
comprehensive solution for drug trafficking and concluding that "Congress in-
tended to eliminate the defense of impossibility when it enacted [this statute]").
The court further noted that 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) was created to provide "law en-
forcement with the tools it needs to investigate and bring to justice those individu-
als who prey on our nation's children." See Tykarsky, 446 F.3d at 467 (quoting H.R.
REP. No. 105-557, at 10 (1998)) (acknowledging that Child Protection and Sexual
Predator Punishment Act of 1998 was originally designed as "comprehensive re-
sponse to the horrifying menace of sex crimes against children, particularly as-
saults facilitated by computers"). The Committee also stated that "[t]hose who
believe they are victimizing children, even if they come into contact with a law
enforcement officer who poses as a child, should be punished just as if a real child
were involved." See H.R. RP. No. 105-557, at 19 (1998) (establishing Committee's
position on use of decoys by law enforcement officers).
87. See Tykarsky, 446 F.3d at 468 (quoting Hsu, 155 F.3d at 202) (discussing
evolving views of impossibility defense). The court also noted that § 2422(b) was
initially added to Title 18 in 1996, almost thirty years after the drafters of the
Model Penal Code first proposed abolishing the impossibility defense. See id. (es-
tablishing impossibility was disfavored at statute's inception). For further discus-
sion of the American Law Institute's position on legal impossibility as set forth in
the Comments to the MPC, see supra note 54 and accompanying text.
88. See Tykarsky, 446 F.3d at 468 (noting elimination of legal impossibility was
overwhelmingly common at time statute was enacted and concluding that it there-
fore was doubtful that Congress intended legal impossibility to be permissible de-
fense to § 2422(b)).
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16
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 5 [2007], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol52/iss5/5
adopt Tykarsky's interpretation of the statute, law enforcement officers
would have to use actual minors when conducting sting operations, a re-
sult the court concluded Congress surely did not intend. 9
Turning its attention to § 2423(b), the court determined that neither
factual nor legal impossibility applied.90 The court required only an ab-
breviated analysis to reach this conclusion, due to the unambiguous terms
of the statute itself.9 1 In affirming the district court's denial of Tykarsky's
post-trial motion, the court noted that criminal liability "'turns simply on
the purpose for which [the defendant] traveled."' 92 Additionally, the
court held that there was sufficient evidence on which the jury could base
a finding that Tykarsky traveled from New Jersey to Pennsylvania for the
purpose of engaging in sexual activities with a minor.9 3 The court there-
fore affirmed Tykarsky's conviction under § 2423(b).9 4
IV. APPLICATION OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S TiKAVsiy DECISION
A. Predictions of Alternative Defenses Likely to be Raised by Third
Circuit Defendants
1. Entrapment and Sentencing Entrapment
Despite the Third Circuit's invalidation of impossibility defenses, de-
fendants charged in Internet sting operations can still raise entrapment as
a potential defense.9 5 As set forth by the Supreme Court in Sorrells v.
United States,9 6 entrapment occurs "when the criminal design originates
with the officials of the government and they implant in the mind of an
innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce
its commission in order that they may prosecute."9 7 This defense, entirely
a creation of American law, is specifically directed at undercover opera-
tions.98 It serves as a means to distinguish between those defendants that
89. See id. (commenting that law enforcement's use of decoys in sting opera-
tions enforcing solicitation and child predation crimes is common knowledge and
asserting that it is highly unlikely Congress intended to deprive law enforcement
officers of this method of enforcement).
90. See id. (noting there is "nothing impossible about traveling with a specific
purpose" (citing United States v. Sims, 428 F.3d 945, 949 (10th Cir. 2005))).
91. See id. (establishing that plain language of statute "criminalizes interstate
travel for an illicit purpose").
92. See id. (quoting United States v. Root, 296 F.3d 1222, 1231 (11th Cir.
2002)) (holding that actual age of intended victim is not element of offense).
93. See id. (concluding purpose of Tykarsky's travel falls within statutorily pro-
hibited conduct).
94. See id. (setting forth court's holding regarding § 2423(b)).
95. See United States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 195 (2d Cir. 2006) (addressing
and rejecting defendant's entrapment defense to charges under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2422(b) and 2423(b)), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 2150 (2007).
96. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
97. See id. at 442 (defining entrapment).
98. See Dru Stevenson, Entrapment by Numbers, 16 U. FLA.J.L. & PUB. PoL'v 1, 7-
9 (2005) (noting entrapment defense is unique to America and that certain crimes
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are true criminals and those who were simply coerced into an illegal activ-
ity they would not have otherwise engaged in without police induce-
ment.9 9 Inducement occurs when a criminal idea is ingrained in a
defendant's mind by improper government acts, such as "persuasion,
fraudulent representations, threats, coercive tactics, harassment, promises
of reward, or pleas based on sympathy, need, or friendship." 10 0 To assess
whether a defendant has been entrapped by the government, the court
must identify whether the government agent improperly induced the de-
fendant to commit the crime and whether the defendant was predisposed
to commit the crime. 10 1
To successfully assert an entrapment defense, defendants must pro-
vide evidence that they were not predisposed to commit the charged
crime. 10 2 Defendants may satisfy this burden by identifying such evidence
in the government's case-in-chief, by eliciting such evidence during cross
examination of a government witness, or by presenting their own case-in-
mandate such constant surveillance that sting operations are most "feasible and
efficient" means of policing). Specifically, crimes that are "willing party" activities,
.such as sexual impropriety with minors, sales of contraband and firearms, and
bribery," lend themselves to regulation via undercover operations. See id. at 8-9
(explaining certain crimes are best regulated through undercover sting
operations).
99. See id. at 9 (noting necessity of distinguishing between true criminals and
victims of police inducement).
100. See Gregg, supra note 31, at 178 (defining "inducement"). Inducement
also occurs when government actions encourage someone to turn "'from a right-
eous path to an iniquitous one.'" See Book, supra note 12, at 759 (quoting Marreel
v. Florida, 841 So. 2d 600, 603 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)) (listing further defini-
tions of inducement); see also Gregg, supra note 31, at 179 (listing methods
through which inducement can occur).
101. See Book, supra note 12, at 759 (discussing two-prong test for determin-
ing whether defendant was entrapped). The Supreme Court developed a two-
prong test, requiring two separate threshold inquiries into inducement and predis-
position; these inquiries, however, are clearly related. See Jacobson v. United
States, 503 U.S. 540, 548-49 (1992) (noting prosecution's burden of proof in en-
trapment defense); see also Book, supra note 12, at 760 n.107 (recognizing link
between inducement and predisposition); Sheetz, supra note 1, at 444 (observing
that if law enforcement officer makes initial contact with potential defendant and
repeatedly solicits potential defendant for criminal liability, this constitutes
entrapment).
102. See Book, supra note 12, at 763 (asserting defendant's burden). This bur-
den of proof is aligned with the subjective test of entrapment, which is the theory
presented by the Supreme Court in United States v. Sorrells. See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at
442 (establishing subjective test for entrapment). This is the law in the federal
courts. See Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 62-63 (1988) (asserting subjec-
tive entrapment test is law in federal courts). Many state legislatures and several
state supreme courts, however, have adopted an objective test for entrapment,
which focuses on the government's role in the investigation, rather than on the
accused's predisposition. See Gregg, supra note 31, at 180 (explaining develop-
ment and application of objective test of entrapment). This Casebrief will focus on
the subjective test and federal law. For further discussion of the objective test, see
Gregg, supra note 31, at 180-86.
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chief. 1°)" Assuming that the defendant is able to present sufficient evi-
dence to satisfy this burden, "[t]he burden then shifts to the government
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [the] defendant was not en-
trapped."' 0 4 The government will typically prevail so long as it can prove
that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime in question, inde-
pendent of the government's influence. 10 5 The Supreme Court has not
adopted a bright-line rule as to how the government can satisfy this bur-
den, and instead endorses a sliding scale, requiring a greater demonstra-
tion of predisposition in situations where the government's conduct was
especially aggressive. 10 6 If a defendant raises an entrapment defense, the
jury instructions will likely include an instruction that a person was en-
trapped if "'he has no previous intent or purpose to violate the law,' but is
not entrapped if he was 'ready and willing to commit crimes such as
charged in the indictment, whenever the opportunity was afforded."
10 7
103. See Book, supra note 12, at 763-64 (providing methods through which
defendants may meet their burden); see also Stevenson, supra note 98, at 21 ("The
level of proof required of the defendant varies somewhat from jurisdiction tojuris-
diction, but is lower than a burden of proof.").
104. See Book, supra note 12, at 764 (citing Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 549) (describ-
ing burden shifting of entrapment).
105. See id. at 771 (recognizing continued viability of entrapment defense); see
also Stevenson, supra note 98, at 26 (acknowledging that "[e]ntrapment cases are
necessarily a subset of the number of sting operations" being conducted). As
pointed out by Professor Stevenson, as the number of entrapment cases rises due
to increases in the number of sting operations conducted, defendants' likelihood
of prevailing on this defense will decline. See Stevenson, supra note 98, at 26-27
(predicting limited viability of entrapment defense in future). This decline will
result from the development of bright-line rules, a natural by-product of case law,
which will serve to clearly define permissible law enforcement practices, making
raising this defense a futile endeavor. See id. (same).
106. See Gregg, supra note 31, at 179 (noting that cases suggest Supreme
Court's endorsement of sliding scale for amount of predisposition needed). While
the Supreme Court has not provided a clear test as to what factors constitute pre-
disposition, lower federal courts have established a list of relevant factors,
including:
(1) the defendant's reluctance to respond to inducement; (2) the totality
of circumstances surrounding the criminal enterprise; (3) the defen-
dant's state of mind prior to any overtures by the government; (4) the
defendant's involvement in pre-existing criminal conduct similar to that
for which he is charged; (5) the existence of a prior plan on the part of
the defendant to commit the crime for which he is charged; (6) the de-
fendant's prior reputation; (7) the defendant's reluctance or eagerness
during negotiations with the undercover agent; (8) whether there was a
pattern of refusing the government inducements prior to the action for
which the defendant is charged; (9) the nature of the crime charged;
(10) the degree of coercion present in the police conduct in inducing
the activity relative to the defendant's criminal experience.
Id. (quoting United States v. Dion, 762 F.2d 674, 687-88 (8th Cir. 1985), rev'd in
part, 476 U.S. 734 (1986)) (listing factors to be considered in predisposition
analysis).
107. See id. at 180 (quoting Steven Duke, Entrapment Defense Languishes in a
Permanent State of Confusion, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 21, 1983, at 32) (providing standard
jury instruction for entrapment).
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One possible alternative to raising traditional entrapment as a de-
fense is asserting sentencing entrapment instead. 10 8 Sentencing entrap-
ment is a result of the implementation of mechanical sentencing
guidelines; accordingly, this defense can potentially provide relief for de-
fendants involved in sting operations in which the government agent spe-
cifically planned the terms and conditions of the sting around provisions
of the sentencing guidelines in order to increase defendants' sentences.
109
Much like the standard entrapment defense, sentencing entrapment
places the burden on defendants to show that they were not predisposed
to commit the crime or crimes at issue."10
In Tykarsky, the Third Circuit declined to address Tykarsky's sentenc-
ing entrapment argument, asserting that the doctrine was not applicable
to the instant situation. 1 ' The Third Circuit's refusal to address this is-
sue, and its pointed mention of the fact that the Third Circuit has never
recognized this doctrine, suggests that the court is not likely to accept this
as a defense in Internet sting operation cases. 112 Taking into account the
Third Circuit's position on the issue, together with a general disfavoring of
the doctrine, defendants are unlikely to prevail on such claims, as evi-
denced by Tykarsky's failed attempt." 3
2. Fantasy/Role Playing
Another possible defense has taken root as a result of the develop-
ment of an "Internet Culture."1 4 This culture, complete with its own set
108. See Stevenson, supra note 98, at 39 (discussing sentencing entrapment).
"Sentencing entrapment" is a general phrase used to describe an entire situation,
including "the agents' tactic itself, the defense, and the body of cases or concept."
Id. at 43 (defining concept of sentencing entrapment).
109. See id. at 39-40 (explaining that agents posing as decoys online can pre-
tend to be young enough trigger highest sentencing range).
110. See id. at 41-42 (establishing defendant's burden when asserting sentenc-
ing entrapment).
111. See United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 476 n.13 (3d Cir. 2006) (re-
jecting Tykarsky's assertion that sentencing entrapment occurred because govern-
ment allegedly delayed sting operation until after enhanced penalties were
effected). In addition to agreeing with the district court that sentencing entrap-
ment was not applicable in Tykarsky's case, the court further noted that the Third
Circuit has not yet recognized the doctrine of sentencing entrapment. See id. (cit-
ing United States v. Raven, 39 F.3d 428, 438 (3d Cir. 1994)) (asserting court's
current position on sentencing entrapment).
112. See id. (observing Third Circuit's refusal to recognize sentencing entrap-
ment and asserting that even if doctrine applied, government's conduct was not
sufficiently outrageous to qualify as sentencing entrapment).
113. See Stevenson, supra note 98, at 45 (noting that sentencing entrapment
claims peaked in federal courts in 1996-1997 and commenting that such claims
currently "do not fare well at all"). For further discussion of the Third Circuit's
position on sentencing entrapment, see supra notes 111-112 and accompanying
text.
114. See Donald S. Yamagami, Comment, Prosecuting Cyber-Pedophiles: How Can
Intent Be Shown in a Virtual World in Light of the Fantasy Defense?, 41 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 547, 562 (2001) (commenting on development of "Internet Culture").
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of social norms, is the pivotal element of the fantasy/role playing de-
fense. 1 5 The Internet has created a virtual environment in which it is
acceptable for utter strangers to carry out sexual fantasies in online chat
rooms featuring themes such as "submission, dominance, incest, fetishes,
and homosexual fantasies."1 16 The anonymity of the Internet provides the
perfect protective shield for people engaging in such behaviors, allowing
users to role play while hiding their true identities. 1 7 As such, defendants
in sting operation cases have implemented a defense to this effect-de-
fendants claim that they never believed they were actually speaking with a
minor, but rather thought that they were conversing with an adult, engag-
ing in a mutual, role playing fantasy with that person.1 18 Under this in-
creasingly common defense, defendants contend that, because they never
actually believed that a minor was involved, they lacked the requisite
intent to "knowingly persuade[ ], induce[ ], entice[ ], or coerce[ ]" a mi-
nor, thereby relieving them of liability under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422(b) and
2423(b).11 9 This defense is most likely to be successful in situations where
the conversations between the predator and the decoy took place in chat
rooms with names indicative of role playing and chat rooms that are sup-
posedly restricted to adults.120 Additionally, defendants are more likely to
prevail with this defense in situations where they made comments
throughout the conversation reinforcing their position that they were only
"pretending." 12 1
115. See id. at 562-63 (observing differences between traditional relationships
and online relationships).
116. See id. at 563 (explaining importance of anonymity on Internet and how
anonymity has resulted in establishment of new social norms regarding sexual
behaviors).
117. See Book, supra note 12, at 767-68 (commenting that "by its very nature
* . . the Internet is a 'fantasy world' where people role-play while hiding behind
anonymity").
118. See id. at 767 (explaining nature of fantasy defense).
119. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422(b), 2423(b) (Supp. IV 2004) (setting forth requi-
site intent for conviction); see also Book, supra note 12, at 767 (describing applica-
tion of fantasy defense and noting its increasing popularity in Internet sting
operation cases).
120. See Book, supra note 12, at 768-69 (establishing significant facts of suc-
cessful fantasy case). The fantasy defense was first utilized in the case of Patrick
Naughten, a thirty-four-year-old man who was "arrested and tried for 'crossing state
lines with the intent to have sex with a minor, and using the Internet to arrange to
try to have sex with a minor."' See id. at 768 (detailing facts). The minor, however,
was actually a government decoy. See id. (same). Naughten, using the fantasy/role
playing defense and claiming that he believed he was meeting a grown woman
"who shared his 'daddy/daughter' fantasy," was acquitted due to a deadlocked
jury. See id. at 768-69 (detailing facts and holding). The critical aspect of his fan-
tasy defense was that he had met the government decoy in an "adults only" chat
room entitled "dad&daughtersex," which supported his position that he believed
the decoy to be over eighteen years of age and a willing participant in the role
playing situation. See id. at 769 (stating critical aspects of Naughten's defense).
121. See id. at 770 (explaining online predators are often aware of legal devel-
opments and will therefore insert comments into conversation suggesting they are
only pretending in order to utilize fantasy defense).
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B. Recommendations for Practitioners
Although defendants still attempt to employ entrapment as a defense
in Internet sting operation cases, some legal commentators have declared
that the traditional entrapment defense is ill-suited for Internet cases and
should therefore be modified or eliminated as it applies to these cases.
122
Until such modification or elimination occurs, however, prosecutors
within the Third Circuit should continue to prepare for the possibility of
this defense.1 23 In order to defeat a defendant's entrapment claim, the
prosecution needs to effectively establish that the defendant's own predis-
position led to the commission of the crime, rather than any actions taken
by law enforcement.1 24 Provided that the predator proactively logged into
the suspect chat room and voluntarily engaged in repeated conversations
with the decoy, this will normally be sufficient to satisfy the government's
predisposition burden.
125
When handling an Internet sting operation case in which the defen-
dant asserts a fantasy or role playing defense, prosecutors should refer to
the transcripts of the online conversations. 126 Law enforcement agents
122. See, e.g., Stevenson, supra note 98, at 69-70 (recognizing problematic na-
ture of applying traditional entrapment law to Internet cases). The five primary
problems with using traditional entrapment law in Internet cases are:
First, "predisposition" . . . is a foregone conclusion in almost all of the
cases because the defendants actively log into certain chat rooms and en-
gage in repeated, typed communications with their intended victims.
Second, in states using the objective test, the conduct and conversations
of the agents can be very difficult to trace or verify. .... Third, the inex-
pensive, relatively invisible nature of such operations also permits private
entrapment to become rampant, which is not the case in off-line settings
or with other crimes. . . . Fourth, traditional entrapment rules have
tended to relax certain evidentiary rules, particularly about admission of
"past crimes." On-line stings present special, new evidentiary problems
because the on-line conversations, although recorded on a computer's
storage system, are out of context when later submitted as evidence in
court .... Finally, many of these cases frame the charges as "attempt"
crimes .... Most jurisdictions use a test requiring only that the defen-
dant take some "substantial step" toward the commission of an offense in
order to be convicted of attempt.... Not having to wait for a completed
crime or transaction allows law enforcement to use simplified stings ....
The abbreviated fact pattern of an attempt charge gives the defense less
with which to work in concocting an entrapment defense.
Id. at 69-72 (footnotes omitted) (describing problems with entrapment defense).
123. Cf Stevenson, supra note 98, at 75 (stating that entrapment laws are not
easily adaptable to online stings, thus changes are necessary). But see Book, supra
note 12, at 771 (noting entrapment remains viable defense).
124. See Book, supra note 12, at 772 (commenting that defendant was likely
not predisposed if it was necessary for government to continuously tempt defen-
dant to commit crime).
125. See Stevenson, supra note 98, at 69 (declaring that predisposition is essen-
tially foregone conclusion when predator actively logged into certain chat rooms
and engaged in conversations with intended victims).
126. See Book, supra note 12, at 770 (stating importance of dialogue between
predator and decoy).
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posing as decoys are trained to constantly remind the predator of the
child's alleged age; prosecutors should assert that these reminders ade-
quately informed the defendants that they were speaking with a minor.
127
In addition to the conversation transcripts, prosecutors can utilize other
evidence that suggests that defendants believed they were meeting a child
rather than an adult, such as small-sized sex toys that are seized at the time
of arrest. 128 Moreover, when conducting voir dire and selecting jurors,
prosecutors should be aware that male jurors are generally more accepting
of a fantasy or role playing defense than female jurors. 129
V. TTFN: 13 0 THE THIRD CIRCUIT SIGNS OFF
The gravity of the issue addressed in United States v. Tykarsky should
serve as a sobering reminder to adults of the dangers children face from
their online "friends."13 1 As pedophiles' access to children continuously
expands via the Internet, so should the access that law enforcement agents
have to pedophiles through sting operations. 13 2 In concluding that the
actual involvement of a minor is not necessary to sustain a conviction
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422(b) and 2423(b), the Third Circuit acknowledged
the importance of targeting online predators and explicitly approved the
use of sting operations in accomplishing this objective. 13 3 Furthermore,
in declining to accept the impossibility defense for crimes under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2422(b) and 2423(b), the court has significantly limited the options
available to Third Circuit defendants seeking to challenge the charges
against them.13 4 While entrapment and fantasy and role playing are po-
tential defenses that provide defendants with some recourse, if the govern-
ment takes appropriate actions to ensure that sting operations are
127. See id. (declaring that constant reiteration of decoy's assumed age helps
mitigate application of fantasy defense).
128. See Rogers, supra note 41, at 517 (referencing case in which defendant's
belief that he was dealing with minor rather than adult was affirmed by fact that he
had small-sized sex toys with him at time of face-to-face meeting).
129. SeeYamagami, supra note 114, at 572 (commenting that one reason men
are more willing than women to accept fantasy defense is that "men tend to be
more knowledgeable about computer use and the Internet than women").
130. See Online Lingo, supra note 1 (defining "TTFN" as "ta ta for now").
131. For a discussion of the dangers posed to children by the Internet, see
supra notes 25-39 and accompanying text.
132. See Rogers, supra note 41, at 523 (concluding that law enforcement's ac-
cess to pedophiles should be directly correlated with pedophiles' access to
children).
133. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's holding and reasoning, see supra
notes 82-94 and accompanying text.
134. For a discussion of the alternative defenses available to defendants, see
supra notes 95-121 and accompanying text.
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conducted properly, the government should prevail when litigating
against either defense. 13 5
Elizabeth D. Tempio
135. For a discussion of the government's likelihood of prevailing over the
alternative defenses, see supra notes 122-129 and accompanying text.
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